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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 12-3565 
_____________ 
 
ELIZABEL MENDOZA, 
  
                Appellant 
 
v. 
 
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-11-cv-03363) 
District Judge: Hon. Stanley R. Chesler 
__________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 9, 2013 
 
Before: SMITH, ALDISERT and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed September 10, 2013) 
 
__________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge. 
Elizabel Mendoza appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for 
the District of New Jersey that denied in part her fee-award application, which was 
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submitted pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. She 
contends that the District Court abused its discretion when it reduced her requested fee 
award after making a number of erroneous “categorical legal conclusions” that certain 
fees incurred were not compensable. We will affirm in part and vacate in part the 
judgment of the District Court, and remand with instructions to recalculate the fee award 
consistent with our views set forth hereinafter. 
I. 
 Because we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and the 
proceedings in this case, we will revisit them only briefly. Mendoza filed a complaint in 
the District Court against the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration 
(“SSA”) after denial of her application for disability benefits. Following briefing by both 
Mendoza and the Commissioner, the Commissioner contacted Mendoza on October 12, 
2011 and offered a remand to the SSA for further proceedings. Mendoza raised issues 
with the proposed remand instructions, and accordingly did not consent to remand at that 
time. Ultimately, the District Court remanded the case to the SSA without any special 
remand instructions. 
 This appeal concerns Mendoza’s application for fees under the EAJA, which she 
submitted after the District Court remanded her case to the SSA. Mendoza’s counsel (the 
“Clinic”) sought compensation for 45.75 hours of work, at a rate of $189.10 per hour, for 
a total of $8651.33 in fees. The Commissioner challenged Mendoza’s fee application, 
asserting that no fees should be awarded for any work performed after the October 12, 
2011 remand offer. The District Court agreed, reducing Mendoza’s fee award to 
$3829.28. This sum reflected the 20.25 hours spent by the Clinic as of October 12. This 
award did not include any compensation for time spent preparing the application for fees 
3 
 
or for responding to the Commissioner’s challenge to the fee application. Mendoza 
timely appealed.  
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over Mendoza’s underlying claim pursuant to  
42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and jurisdiction over her motion for fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b); 
we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the reasonableness of a fee 
award for abuse of discretion, but we review de novo the legal standard applied by the 
District Court in calculating the fee award. Jama v. Esmor Corr. Servs., Inc., 577 F.3d 
169, 173 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Evans v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 273 F.3d 346, 358 (3d 
Cir. 2001).   
III. 
 Before the District Court, the Commissioner argued that Mendoza should not be 
awarded any fees accrued after October 12, 2011, the date the Commissioner offered a 
consent remand. The District Court agreed and therefore awarded Mendoza all claimed 
fees incurred as of that date, but awarded no fees for work performed by the Clinic after 
that date. We share the sentiments of the experienced District Court Judge that there may 
have been “overlitigation” after the Commissioner’s offer of a consent remand. The 
District Court acted well within its discretion in denying fees for legal work on the merits 
of the case performed after that offer was made, particularly given the lack of success 
achieved by Mendoza after that point. We agree with Mendoza, however, that she was 
entitled to at least some fees for the time spent preparing the fee application itself, 
because a fee application would have been necessary even had Mendoza agreed to the 
Commissioner’s original remand offer. Lost amidst the District Court’s frustration with 
the Clinic was careful consideration of the appropriateness of all claimed fees and 
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specific statements as to why certain fees would be awarded and others rejected. See 
Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1187 (3d Cir. 1990) (“The district court should 
explain why it concludes that hours expended on a task are excessive.”). Rather, the 
approach taken by the District Court here was to categorically reject any and all fees 
incurred after the consent remand offer, including those incurred in preparing the fee 
application itself. The rationale for rejecting fees here based on “overlitigation” does not 
apply with equal force to all of the hours spent on the fee application. 
 Accordingly, we will remand to the District Court to calculate reasonable 
attorneys’ fees for work performed after the Commissioner’s remand offer on October 
12, 2011.
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*   *   *   *   * 
 We have considered all of the arguments advanced by the parties and conclude 
that no further discussion is necessary. The judgment of the District Court will be 
affirmed in part and vacated in part, and the proceedings remanded in accordance with 
the foregoing. 
                                                 
1 
We wish to recognize and commend the Rutgers-Newark Urban Legal Clinic’s vigorous 
representation of Ms. Mendoza. We note, however, that just as the District Court was 
frustrated with what it deemed “overlitigation” of this case, we too believe that some 
effort expended before our Court was ultimately redundant and unnecessary. We provide 
this constructive criticism as part of the educational experience for the Clinic’s students, 
and to encourage them to continue honing their craft. 
